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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 4566

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJ: MBFR: DATA STUDIES

REFS: A) USNATO 3657 DTG 091444Z JUL 75; B) STATE 181816

DTG 011640Z AUG 75

1. THERE FOLLOWS THE LATEST DRAFT OF THE WG PAPER ENTITLED, "MBFR DATA - BASIS OF COUNTING MANPOWER STRENGTH" (REF A). THIS IS BEING CIRCULATED AS A FINAL WG PAPER, AD REFERENDUM. (THE US AND THE FRG HAVE NOT YET APPROVED). WHEN THE PAPER IS APPROVED, IT WILL BE RELEASED AS AN INTERNAL WG REFERENCE DOCUMENT.

2. ACTION REQUESTED: REQUEST COMMENTS AND GUIDANCE IN TIME FOR SEPTEMBER 9 WG MEETING.

3. BEGIN TEXT

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS WORKING GROUP

MBFR DATA - BASIS OF COUNTING MANPOWER STRENGTH

DRAFT REPORT BY THE WORKING GROUP

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PURPOSE OF THE PAPER

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER IS TO PROVIDE A CRITICAL

EXAMINATION OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF DETERMINING MANPOWER

STRENGTHS OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE NGA.

BASIS OF COUNTING NATO FORCES

2. BACKGROUND TO NATO ADOPTING "ACTUAL STRENGTHS"

(A) IN 1971 THE STAFF GROUP SUBMITTED TO THE WORKING GROUP A SHORT PAPER(1) WHICH TOUCHED ON SOME OF THE PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE COUNTING OF MANPOWER FOR MBFR PURPOSES. THE ISSUE WAS AGAIN RAISED IN MID-1972, WHEN THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CONSTRAINTS SUB-GROUP POSED THE QUESTION AS TO WHAT COUNTING METHOD WAS TO BE ADOPTED WHEN ADDRESSING FORCES SUBJECT TO MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS. A UK NOTE(2) IN ANSWER TO THE CONSTRAINTS PROBLEM, ILLUSTRATED THE ADVISABILITY OF USING "ACTUAL" VERSUS "WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS".

(B) FOLLOWING MUCH DISCUSSION ON THE BASIS TO BE USED IN COUNTING MANPOWER STRENGTHS, THE WORKING GROUP WAS OF THE OPINION THAT ONLY ACTIVE DUTY FORCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN AS FAR AS MANPOWER REDUCTIONS WERE CONCERNED. THE WORKING GROUP SUBMITTED THE REASONS FOR THIS CHOICE AS PART OF A REPORT TO THE COUNCIL(3), AND INCLUDED THE FACT THAT THE US RESERVED THEIR POSITION ON THE MATTER. THIS REPORT WAS APPROVED BY THE COUNCIL (4) FOR TRANSMISSION TO MINISTERS. THE RELEVANT PART OF THE REPORT READS AS FOLLOWS:

FOOTNOTES

(1) AC/276-WP(71)6, 12TH MARCH, 1971

(2) AC/276-WP(72)24, 29TH MAY, 1972

(3) AC/276-D(72)6, 16TH NOVEMBER, 1972

(4) C-M(72)81(REVISED), 27TH NOVEMBER, 1972

"WE ARE AGREED THAT, WHILE IT IS NECESSARY FOR NATO ALLIES' NEGOTIATORS AND SUPPORTING STAFFS TO BE FULL INFORMED OF WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS AND OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THOSE WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS AND ACTUAL STRENGTHS AT M-DAY,
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IT WOULD NOT BE PRACTICAL NOR POLITIC TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS TO REDUCE WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS. SINCE ACTUAL STRENGTHS FOR NATO ARE GENERALLY LOWER THAN WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS, SMALL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS FROM A BASE OF WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS MIGHT IN SOME CASES NOT RESULT IN ANY REDUCTIONS ACTUALLY BEING CARRIED OUT, WHICH WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF MBFR. MOREOVER, THE USE OF WAR AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS IN NEGOTIATIONS COULD REVEAL INFORMATION OF GREAT VALUE TO A POTENTIAL ENEMY AND, FURTHER, COULD RESTRICT THE ALLIES' POWERS, AFTER AN AGREEMENT WAS ATTAINED, TO MAKE DEFENCE PLANS TO MEET CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES. WE ARE, THEREFORE, CONTINUING OUR TECHNICAL STUDIES ON THE APPROACH TO MBFR, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT EXPLORATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS WILL DISCUSS REDUCTIONS IN ACTUAL STRENGTHS."

3. FACTORS BEARING ON THE USE OF "ACTUAL STRENGTHS"

(A) EFFECTIVE DATE OF REPORTED STRENGTH. THE MBFR WORKING GROUP ACCEPTED 31ST DECEMBER AS THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF REPORTED STRENGTH BECAUSE THE DATES FOR THE INTAKE AND RELEASE OF CONSCRIPTS VARIES BETWEEN COUNTRIES, EXCEPT AT THE END OF THE YEAR AT WHICH TIME THE SITUATION IS MORE STABLE. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF CHRISTMAS/NEW YEAR HOLIDAYS A NUMBER OF CONSCRIPTS ARE RELEASED IN MID TO LATE DECEMBER, AND THE NEW INTAKE NOT PROCESSED UNTIL EARLY JANUARY, UNLIKE THE NORMAL PRACTICE OF COMBINING THE TWO OPERATIONS ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY; CONSEQUENTLY, THE "ACTUAL STRENGTH" AS AT 31ST DECEMBER, IF CORRECTLY REPORTED BY THOSE COUNTRIES HAVING CONSCRIPTS WOULD REFLECT A LOWER STRENGTH THAN AT OTHER TIMES OF THE YEAR. THE SYSTEMS ANALYSIS SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF THAT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR COL-LATING NATO DATA, WILL INVESTIGATE AT THE NEXT DATA MANAGEMENT AND FORCES ANALYSIS MEETING, SCHEDULED FOR LATE AUTUMN, THE TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY OF CHANGING THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF REPORTED STRENGTH FROM THAT OF OF CONSCRIPTS DOES NOT OCCUR AND WHICH COINCIDES WITH THE EFFECTIVE PERIOD OF REPORTED WARSAW PACT ESTIMATED STRENGTHS (I.E. MID-YEAR) AS PUBLISHED FOLLOWING THE MC 224 CONFERENCE.

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(B) DEFINITION OF "PERSONNEL ON ACTIVE DUTY IN PEACETIME (NATO FORCES)". "THE TOTAL NUMBER OF PERSONNEL ON ACTIVE DUTY IN UNITS AS AT 31ST DECEMBER. PERSONNEL ON COURSES, LEAVE, TEMPORARY DUTY, IN HOSPITAL, ETC., BUT CHARGED AGAINST UNIT OR FORMATION STRENGTH ARE TO BE INCLUDED"(1).

(C) ANNUAL STRENGTH RETURNS - NATO GROUND FORCES

(1) IN NOVEMBER, THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF REQUESTS NATIONS TO SUBMIT BY END FEBRUARY THE INFORMATION REQUIRED TO UPDATE DATA HELD AT THE NATO FORCE PLANNING DATA BASE (IS). SOME MODS, ANTICIPATING THIS REQUEST START PREPARING THEIR ACTUAL STRENGTH RETURNS PRIOR TO 31ST DECEMBER WITH THE RESULT THAT THE "ACTUAL STRENGTH" REPORTED BY THEM FOR PERIOD 31ST DECEMBER (SEE (A) ABOVE) IS OFTEN AN ESTIMATE.

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(2) THE BASIS OF COUNTING ACTUAL ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL
DIFFERS BETWEEN NATO COUNTRIES:

(I) BELGIUM REPORTS ITS TRUE "ACTUAL STRENGTH AS AT
31ST DECEMBER". IN OTHER WORDS, IT DOES NOT
INCLUDE IN ITS COMPUTATIONS THE ESTIMATED INTAKE
OF JANUARY CONSCRIPTS AND ITS REPORTED FIGURE
COULD BE ON THE LOW SIDE.

(II) THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES ARE INTEGRATED AND
NOT IDENTIFIABLE AS PURELY GROUND OR AIR FORCES.
HOWEVER, FOR MBFR PURPOSES OTTAWA DECIDED ON A
BREAKDOWN OF ITS FORCES IN THE NGA IN THE DESIRED
MANNER. CANADA REPORTS ITS "ACTUAL STRENGTH AS
AT 31ST DECEMBER". THESE FIGURES WHEN ROUNDED
TAKE CARE OF MINOR FLUCTUATIONS. THE FIGURES
GIVEN CAN BE CONSIDERED AS BEING AN ACCURATE
PORTRAYAL OF "ACTUAL STRENGTH AS AT 31ST DECEMBER",
AND CONSISTENT WITH ACTUAL STRENGTH LEVELS
THROUGHOUT THE YEAR.

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FOOTNOTE:

(1) AC/276(SGDS)-N/18(3RD REVISE), 30TH OCTOBER, 1974

(III) THE ONLY OFFICIAL INFORMATION ON FRENCH FORCES
IN THE NGA IS TO BE FOUND IN THE ANNUAL NATIONAL
RETURN TO THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF: DRC/N(FRANCE).
THIS FIGURE SHOULD ONLY BE REGARDED AS A REASON-
ABLE ESTIMATE OF "ACTUAL STRENGTH AS AT
31ST DECEMBER".

(IV) THE FRG PROVIDES A MEAN STRENGTH WHICH LIES AT SOME POINT BETWEEN ITS PEAK AND LOWEST ACTUAL STRENGTH REACHED IN THE COURSE OF THE CALENDAR YEAR, AND IN PRACTICAL TERMS IS VERY NEAR TO THE "ACTUAL STRENGTH AS OF 31ST DECEMBER".

(V) LUXEMBOURG PROVIDES ITS TRUE "ACTUAL STRENGTH" AS AT 31ST DECEMBER. THE STRENGTH REMAINS CONSTANT THROUGHOUT THE YEAR.

(VI) THE NETHERLANDS PREPARE THEIR ANNUAL STRENGTH RETURN IN EARLY DECEMBER IN ORDER TO AVOID FLUCTUATIONS THAT MIGHT OCCUR DURING THE END OF DECEMBER PERIOD. THE RESULTING FIGURE, WHICH DOES NOT INCLUDE 7,000 PERSONNEL ON "SHORT LEAVE", IS REPORTED AS THE "ACTUAL STRENGTH AS AT 31ST DECEMBER". THE REPORTED STRENGTH IS CLOSE TO THE NORMAL REPRESENTATIVE STRENGTH OF NL GROUND FORCES THROUGHOUT THE YEAR.

(VII) THE UK REPORTS ITS ACTUAL STRENGTH AS AT 31ST DECEMBER. THIS FIGURE IS NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ACTUAL STRENGTH THROUGHOUT THE YEAR BECAUSE OF RECRUITING VARIATIONS. HISTORICALLY, HOWEVER, IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN WITHIN A THOUSAND OF THE NORMAL STRENGTH.

(VIII) THE US SUBMITS IN ITS RETURN THE "PEACETIME AUTHORIZED STRENGTH" OF ITS FORCES IN THE NGA - A FIGURE WHICH COULD DIFFER FROM THE "ACTUAL
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STRENGTH AS AT 31ST DECEMBER" AND COULD BE SAID TO REPRESENT A PEAK STRENGTH FOR THE YEAR.

(3) FROM THE ABOVE, IT WILL BE EVIDENT THAT THE AGGREGATE FIGURE FOR NATO'S FORCE STRENGTH IN THE NGA DERIVED FROM THESE NATIONAL RETURNS DOES NOT REPRESENT, STRICTLY

SPEAKING, NATO'S "ACTUAL STRENGTH" AS AT 31ST DECEMBER FOR THE YEAR IN QUESTION.

NATO ASSESSMENT OF WARSAW PACT STRENGTHS

4. NATO'S ASSESSMENT OF WARSAW PACT GROUND AND AIR FORCE STRENGTHS IS ARRIVED AT AS A RESULT OF PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCES(1) AT NATO HEADQUARTERS. IN ESTIMATING THESE STRENGTHS THE PEACETIME READINESS AND MANNING LEVELS OF UNITS ARE CONSIDERED. THE RESULTING ESTIMATES ARE BASED ON A COMPROMISE OF NATIONAL ASSESSMENTS. DUE TO THIS COMPROMISE, THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, IMS, IS NOT IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE POSSIBLE MARGIN OF ERROR IN THE NATO AGREED FIGURES FOR WARSAW

PACT MANPOWER STRENGTHS; BUT THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES RECOGNIZE THAT VARIATIONS DO EXIST BETWEEN THE NATIONAL ASSESSMENTS OF MANPOWER STRENGTHS, AND THAT NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CUT-OFF DATES ARE NOT THE SAME FOR ALL TYPES OF WARSAW PACT UNITS. FOR EXAMPLE: THE GROUND FIGURES REPRESENT NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN DIVISIONS BETWEEN 2 PCT AND 5 PCT; FOR SOME INDIVIDUAL UNITS LESS EASILY OBSERVED THE DISCREPANCY COULD AMOUNT TO 10 PCT. FURTHERMORE, THE ALLIED ASSESSMENTS OF WP MANPOWER ARE RELATED DIRECTLY TO ALLIED INTELLIGENCE ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF WP COMBAT AND OTHER UNITS, AND ON THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT OF THOSE UNITS. THESE DO NOT REMAIN STATIC. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, TIME-LAGS, FIRST IN ALLIED IDENTIFICATION OF CHANGES AND, LATER, IN NATO AGREEMENT ON THOSE CHANGES AND IN CONSEQUENTIAL ADJUSTMENT OF MANPOWER FIGURES. THESE DELAYS COULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON THE ACCURACY OF ALLIED MANPOWER ESTIMATES OF WP STRENGTH, PARTICULARLY WHEN THERE AS (AS HAS BEEN THE CASE FOR THE PAST FEW YEARS) A TREND TOWARDS INCREASES IN CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF WP FORCES. FOR THESE REASONS THE MBFR WORKING GROUP IS OF THE OPINION(2) THAT THE ALLIED ESTIMATES OF WARSAW PACT MANPOWER IN THE NGA MAY BE SUBJECT TO ERROR AS HIGH AS 10 PCT.

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5. THE WARSAW PACT REPRESENTATIVES AT VIENNA HAVE CHALLENGED NATO AGREED ESTIMATES OF PACT MANPOWER AND TANK STRENGTHS IN THE NGA; HOWEVER, THE WORKING GROUP BELIEVE THAT UNTIL THE BASIC COUNTING ASSUMPTIONS USED BY THE WARSAW PACT ARE KNOWN, RELIABLE COMPARISONS BETWEEN NATO AGREED FIGURES AND PACT CLAIMS CANNOT BE FRUITFULLY UNDERTAKEN.

FOOTNOTES:

- (1) MC 224 TO&E CONFERENCE HELD ANNUALLY IN SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE AD HOC INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE (MBFR) AND THE MC 161 INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE HELD ANNUALLY IN MARCH.
(2) AC/276-D(74)8, PARAGRAPH 16

MANPOWER FLUCTUATIONS

6. FLUCTUATIONS IN MANPOWER STRENGTHS(1) OCCUR IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA DURING THE YEAR AS A RESULT OF VOLUNTARY RECRUITING TRENDS, CONSCRIPTION AND OF TROOP ROTATIONS. IN NATO, THE TIME PERIOD FOR PROCESSING CONSCRIPTS DIFFERS BETWEEN COUNTRIES AS DOES THE SYSTEM AND TIME PERIOD FOR THE ROTATION OF TROOPS. THE WARSAW PACT MUST ALSO HAVE SIMILAR PROBLEMS. SUCH FLUCTUATIONS ARE NOT TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY NATO WHEN CALCULATING ITS OWN OR THE WARSAW PACT'S MANPOWER STRENGTH(2).

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FOOTNOTES:

(1) NATIONAL REPLIES TO A REQUEST FOR INFORMATION REGARDING THE AGGREGATE NATO MANPOWER STRENGTH FLUCTUATION RESULTING FROM RECRUITING, CONSCRIPTION AND TROOP ROTATION FACTORS, SHOW THAT THE VARIATIONS FROM THE 31ST DECEMBER FIGURE REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 3(B)(3) ABOVE WILL FALL BETWEEN PLUS 8,200 AND MINUS 4,000 IN THE CASE OF GROUND FORCES AND UP TO A MAXIMUM 4,250 INCREASE IN THE CASE OF AIR FORCES. WARSAW PACT GROUND AND AIR FORCE INCREASES FROM THE SAME CAUSES ARE UNLIKELY TO EXCEED A FEW THOUSAND AT ANY ONE TIME.

(2) THE MBFR WORKING GROUP IS CONDUCTING A STUDY TO DETERMINE THE SCALE OF EXCEPTIONS REQUIRED FOR GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER FOR TRAINING, EXERCISES, ROTATIONS AND OTHER FLUCTUATIONS DURING A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT AND AFTER AN MBFR PHASE II AGREEMENT.

POSSIBLE BASIC COUNTING ASSUMPTIONS FOR NATO FORCES

7. CURRENT FIGURES FOR NATO'S OWN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER

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STRENGTHS WHICH HAVE BEEN TABLED IN VIENNA ARE THOSE ARRIVED AT BY THE PROCESS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 3(C)(1). FOR REASONS GIVEN IN PARAGRAPH 3(C)(2), THE GROSS FIGURE FOR NATO MANPOWER STRENGTH CANNOT, STRICTLY SPEAKING, BE DESCRIBED AS THE "ACTUAL STRENGTH" FIGURE. WHILE IT MIGHT BE MORE APPROPRIATE TO DESCRIBE THE GROSS FIGURE AS THE "NORMAL REPRESENTATIVE STRENGTH OF ACTUAL ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL THROUGHOUT THE YEAR", THE VARIATION OF COUNT BETWEEN THE TOTAL "ACTUAL STRENGTH" ON THE GROUND AND THE GROSS REPORTED STRENGTH AS AT 31ST DECEMBER (I.E. "NORMAL

REPRESENTATIVE STRENGTH") AMOUNTS TO ONLY ABOUT 8,000 PERSONNEL, (SEE FOOTNOTE(1) AT PAGE 7), THIS DEVIATION OF DECLARED STRENGTH DOES NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT FLUCTUATIONS RESULTING FROM THE TRAINING OF RESERVISTS OR FROM EXERCISES INCLUDING MANPOWER STATIONED OUTSIDE THE NGA.

8.

(A) WERE ALL NATIONS TO AGREE TO THE ADOPTION OF AN "ACTUAL ACTIVE DUTY" COUNT, THE RESULTING FIGURE WOULD BE VALID ONLY AT THE DATE CHOSEN. EVEN WERE THE RETURNS TO BE SUBMITTED MONTHLY, THE RESULT WOULD BE THE SAME.

(B) IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, AN ANNUAL "MATHEMATICAL AVERAGE STRENGTH COUNT" WAS USED BASED ON TWELVE MONTHLY STRENGTH RETURNS, THE VARIATION BETWEEN THIS COUNT AND THE ACTUAL STRENGTH ON THE GROUND AT 31ST DECEMBER (SEE SUB-PARAGRAPH (A) ABOVE) WOULD VARY BY AS LITTLE AS 8,000 PERSONNEL (SEE PARAGRAPH 7 ABOVE). TO PROVIDE SUCH AN AVERAGE STRENGTH COUNT WOULD ENTAIL CONSIDERABLE LABOUR ON THE PART OF NATIONAL AUTHORITIES.

9. THE OBJECT OF PRODUCING THE NATO MANPOWER FIGURE IS TO DECLEAR IT AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EAST. THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD NECESSARILY COVER AN EXTENDED PRIOD OF AT LEAST SEVERAL MONTHS. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE OF LITTLE ADVANTAGE TO ADOPT THE BASIS OF COUNTING GIVEN IN PARAGRAPH 8 ABOVE. MOREOVER, THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT NATIONS WANT TO CHANGE THEIR PRESENT SYSTEM OF COUNTING MANPOWER. THE COUNT ON THE PRESENT BASIS DOES PRODUCE A FIGURE WHICH CAN BE SUBSTANTIATED, EITHER BY PRODCUING NATIONAL FIGURES OR GROSSING UP THE ALLIED COMPONENTS (SEE AC/276-WP(75)12). IT DIFFERS BY ONLY ABOUT 8,000 IN COMPARISON TO THE TOTAL "ACTUAL STRENGTH" ON THE GROUND AS
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AT 31ST DECEMBER. THE SUBSTANCE AND CONTENT OF THAT COUNT WOULD NOT CHANGE TO ANY SIGNIFICANT EXTENT IF THE ALLIES WERE TO ADOPT THE DESCRIPTION "NORMAL REPRESENTATIVE COUNT" RATHER THAN "ACTUAL ACTIVE DUTY COUNT".

FINDINGS

10. WHATEVER COUNTING ASSUMPTIONS ARE ADOPTED BY NATO FOR ITS OWN FORCES, THESE MAY HAVE TO BE EXPLAINED TO THE EAST. AS TO WHETHER THE EAST WILL ACCEPT OUR METHOD OF COUNTING REMAINS TO BE SEEN; SIMILARLY, NATO MIGHT NOT AGREE WITH THE EAST'S COUNTING ASSUMPTIONS; BUT IT MAY BE THAT THE TWO SIDES WILL SIMPLY EXCHANGE THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTING ASSUMPTIONS AND THAT THIS EXCHANGE MAY IN FACT PROVE SATISFACTORY(1). WITH THE ABOVE IN MIND, THE WORKING GROUP BELIEVE THAT:

(A) ALTHOUGH THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF COUNTING NATO MANPOWER CANNOT PRODUCE AN ACCURATE COUNT OF "ACTUAL ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL" ON A GIVEN DATE, IT DOES MEET THE

MBFR NEGOTIATING REQUIREMENTS AS PRESENTLY DEFINED,
AND IS THE BEST WHICH COULD BE ACHIEVED UNDER
PREVAILING CIRCUMSTANCES, IN THAT:

(I) IT PROVIDES A COUNT THAT CAN BE SUBSTANTIATED;

(II) IT PROVIDES A GROSS FIGURE WHICH DIFFERS FROM THE
TOTAL "ACTUAL STRENGTH" ON THE GROUND AS AT
31ST DECEMBER BY ABOUT 8,000 (THIS DIFFERENCE
EXCLUDES FLUCTUATIONS RESULTING FROM RESERVIST
TRAINING AND THE TRAINING/EXERCISING OF MANPOWER
STATIONED OUTSIDE THE NGA).

(III) IT IS WELL UNDERSTOOD WITHIN NATO AND THE
MINOR DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN NATIONAL RESPONSES
AS DESCRIBED IN 3(C)(2) ABOVE ARE WELL KNOWN.

FOOTNOTE:

(1) FOR PURPOSES OF THIS PAPER, IT COULD BE ASSUMED THAT NATO
COUNTING ASSUMPTIONS WOULD NOT BE DISCLOSED TO THE EAST
WITHOUT THE LATER PROVIDING SIMILAR INFORMATION. FURTHER-
MORE, IT IS ASSUMED THAT NEITHER SIDE WILL DIVULGE ITS
METHOD OF COUNTING THE OTHER SIDE'S MANPOWER STRENGTH.

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(B) A PHYSICAL COUNT OF NATO MANPOWER BASED ON "ACTUAL

ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL" IS NOT ACHIEVABLE WITHOUT MAJOR EFFORT BY CERTAIN NATIONS, AND IN ANY CASE WOULD PROVIDE NO SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGE OVER PRESENT SYSTEM.

(C) IT IS NOT CONSIDERED FEASIBLE OR WORTHWHILE TO PRODUCE A COUNT BASED ON AN ANNUAL "MATHEMATICAL AVERAGE COUNT" DERIVED FROM TWELVE MONTHLY STRENGTH RETURNS.

(D) FLUCTUATIONS DUE TO VOLUNTARY RECRUITING TRENDS, CONSCRIPTION AND TROOP ROTATIONS SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE EXCLUDED FROM THE COUNT OF MANPOWER STRENGTH.

(E) A CHANGE OF DESCRIPTION OF THE METHOD OF COUNTING NATO FORCES FROM "ACTUAL ACTIVE DUTY STRENGTH AS AT 31ST DECEMBER" TO "NORMAL REPRESENTATIVE STRENGTH OF ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL THROUGHOUT THE YEAR" WOULD NOT CHANGE TO ANY SIGNIFICANT EXTENT THE SUBSTANCE AND CONTENT OF THE COUNT ON THE PRESENT BASIS, BUT IT WOULD BE A MORE APPROPRIATE DESCRIPTION OF THE TABLED
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NATO FORCE FIGURES.

(F) NATO COUNT CONTINUE TO ASSESS WARSAW PACT GROUND AND AIR FORCE STRENGTHS IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING METHODS, I.E. ON ESTIMATED STRENGTHS AS SUMMARIZED IN PARAGRAPH 4 ABOVE.

(G) THE ALLIED FIGURES FOR ALLIED FORCES ARE NOT AND CANNOT BE DIRECTLY COMPARABLE WITH ALLIED ESTIMATES OF WARSAW PACT MANPOWER: THE BASES OF ASSESSMENT ARE

NECESSARILY DIFFERENT - NATO MANPOWER STRENGTHS BEING BASED ON A NORMAL REPRESENTATIVE STRENGTH WHEREAS WARSAW PACT STRENGTHS ARE DERIVED FROM INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT: IN ADDITION, NATO CANNOT ASSESS THE DEGREE OF ACCURACY OF ITS OWN NATIONAL ASSESSMENTS OF WARSAW PACT FORCES. THE MBFR WORKING GROUP, HOWEVER, HAVE CONSISTENTLY HELD THAT THERE MAY BE A MARGIN OF ERROR OF UP TO 10 PCT IN NATO AGREED ESTIMATES OF WP MANPOWER. THERE WILL ALWAYS BE A TIME-LAG BETWEEN THE DATE OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ON WARSAW PACT FORCES AND ITS INCORPORATION INTO ALLIED AGREED INTELLIGENCE WHEREAS THE NATO COUNT IS MORE UP-TO-DATE.
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